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Fare well, Justice Kirby
Abstract
Who can believe it? ‘The great dissenter’, the judge with a Facebook site dedicated to him,1 the person
known affectionately to his associates as ‘our Judge’, Justice Michael Kirby has reached the end of his
federal judicial tenure. Justice Kirby has turned 70 and, as required by section 72 of the Constitution, must
leave his office in the High Court of Australia. Analysis of the Judge’s jurisprudential influence will flow
soon enough. This piece is instead a reflection on the experiences of his associates to provide some
different insights, such as into the workings of his High Court chambers. Those chambers consisted of a
small team — the Judge, his indomitable personal assistant Janet Saleh and the two associates. There
was never any doubt that the associates (who changed annually) were the least expert of the four. But
between the Judge and his PA, no-one can say who had the upper hand. Janet, may you enjoy your
retirement (that coincides with the Judge’s) and may ‘The Edit Queen’ live on for many happy years
without ever having to see another ‘edit’.
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BRIEFS

ON MICHAEL KIRBY
Fare well, Justice Kirby
ELISA ARCIONI provides an insight into life as one of Justice Kirby’s associates
Who can believe it? ‘The great dissenter’, the judge
with a Facebook site dedicated to him,1 the person
known affectionately to his associates as ‘our Judge’,
Justice Michael Kirby has reached the end of his federal
judicial tenure. Justice Kirby has turned 70 and, as
required by section 72 of the Constitution, must leave
his office in the High Court of Australia.

REFERENCES
1. The Justice Michael Kirby Appreciation
Society, see facebook.com/group.
php?gid=2320132248.
2. Edward is one of the Judge’s last two
associates, for the year 2008/2009.
3. Robert Manne, ‘The descent of
Howard’, The Age (Melbourne) 18 March
2002. See theage.com.au/articles/2002/03
/17/1015909916190.html.

Analysis of the Judge’s jurisprudential influence will flow
soon enough. This piece is instead a reflection on the
experiences of his associates to provide some different
insights, such as into the workings of his High Court
chambers. Those chambers consisted of a small team
— the Judge, his indomitable personal assistant Janet
Saleh and the two associates. There was never any
doubt that the associates (who changed annually) were
the least expert of the four. But between the Judge and
his PA, no-one can say who had the upper hand. Janet,
may you enjoy your retirement (that coincides with the
Judge’s) and may ‘The Edit Queen’ live on for many
happy years without ever having to see another ‘edit’.

The well-known workaholic
A Kirby associate’s average day shows the breadth and
volume of work that travelled through those chambers.
Most High Court associates work exclusively on
judgments. In addition to the Kirby judgment-load
(often greater in page numbers than in other chambers)
the Kirby associates had to arrange travel, cups of tea,
lunches for numerous people, handle dozens of pieces
of correspondence and dabble in some typing. You
name it, we did it.
Although our workload sometimes felt overwhelming,
the following anecdote from Edward Brockhoff2 shows
that the Judge worked more than we did, managing to
fit in an extraordinary amount of extra-judicial activity:
I once accompanied the Judge on a trip to Adelaide. He was
there for exactly 24 hours. In that time, he delivered a speech
at a gala dinner for law students; a speech at a breakfast
for young lawyers; attended a graduation ceremony; dined
with law faculty; delivered speeches at two universities
and attended an opening of barristers’ chambers. I was
exhausted. The Judge was just getting started.

Strength against opposition
The workload was particularly challenging in 2002,
due to two external factors. The first was Gaudron J’s
retirement, which required all outstanding judgments to
be delivered before her departure. The second, being
the more trying of the two, was referred to by Kirby J
in a message inscribed to me at the end of my year:
The year 2002 had its dark side — in the Court and in the
world. The events of March 12th will be written on our
hearts — like s 92 of the Constitution was written on the
heart of Latham CJ. But like the old jurisprudence of s
92, these events and all else pass away… When you look
46 — AltLJ Vol 34:1 2009

back on your time in the High Court of Australia think of
the earnestness and bright spirit with which we tackled so
much together.

The ‘dark side’ to which the Judge referred was the
scandalous (and subsequently unreservedly withdrawn)
allegations made by Senator Heffernan under the veil
of parliamentary privilege. In the wake of Heffernan’s
attack, Kirby J received thousands of emails, letters
and phone calls. All but a handful of these were
expressions of support in response to what Robert
Manne described as ‘the most virulent expression of
homophobia Australian public life had witnessed in very
many years’.3
Characteristically, on the morning following the
allegations, Kirby J did not let them distract him from
his work. He continued with his judicial and extrajudicial activities and quickly set about responding to
every piece of correspondence he had received.

Walking the talk
Perhaps in response to having experienced
discrimination, Kirby J sought to assist others in
overcoming barriers to success. This was especially
true of his method of recruiting associates — much
sought-after positions which help open doors into
academia and private practice. Unlike most High
Court judges, who relied upon recommendations and
unsolicited applications, Kirby J advertised at every
Law School in the country. Without compromising on
standards, he actively sought to employ students from
regional or smaller universities.
Justice Kirby thereby opened up the opportunity to all
students. This can be contrasted with another judge
who has acknowledged that he could be accused of
bias towards certain universities, but stated that he
could justify his choice of associates on the basis of
‘merit’. Justice Kirby’s process meant that he also
reached out to those equally ‘meritorious’ applicants
who had no relationship with the legal community and
who may not even have known that the otherwise
unadvertised positions existed.
The contrast between Kirby J’s open recruitment process
and the approach adopted by many on the Court mirrors
that which often emerged between their respective
approaches to the law. This contrast is revealed in the
following anecdote from Katharine Young.4
I have a memory of the judge explaining his interpretive
theory of the Constitution. ‘I’m a Maximalist, Katie’ he said,
thrusting his arms in the air as if embracing the world.
‘Many on the court are Minimalist, but I’m a Maximalist.’

Judicial ‘rock star’
All the Kirby associates soon realised, if they hadn’t
been aware of it before their appointment, that Kirby
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J has a huge fan club (as well as some detractors). This
celebrity was nowhere more evident than when he
visited Australian universities. I recall students asking
him to sign anything from a copy of the Constitution to
the shirt on their back, which was often printed with a
logo such as ‘We Love Kirby’ or ‘Kirby Rocks’.
What was more surprising to me was his interaction
with other public figures. One day, waiting for a plane
in Canberra and sitting in the Qantas Lounge with
the Judge, I saw the Dalai Lama. The Judge asked if
I’d ever met the spiritual leader of Tibet, to which
I, not surprisingly, answered ‘no’. In response, the
Judge invited the Dalai (with whom he obviously had a
friendship) to join us, introduced me and engaged in an
inclusive discussion. I never imagined such an experience
to be part of the job description of judge’s associate.

Humanity
The last stories I relate convey the humanity of Kirby
J. The warmth and sociability of the Judge is wellknown, and demonstrated to me through his interest
in my family. He came to dinner at my house to meet
them and sends his best wishes to them whenever I
see him. During Court sittings, he would always invite
my partner (now-husband) to the monthly Judge and
associate dinners. In each of his years on the Court,
Kirby J invited his past and present associates and
their partners to celebrate his birthday with him.
Most recently, that invitation extended to my then 10month-old daughter.
Justice Kirby expected a lot from his associates, but was
never unreasonable. Andrew Leigh remembers the day
he forgot to bring a judgment to Court when Kirby J
was to deliver it:5
It was my first month on the job. I was standing behind the
Judge’s chair in Courtroom No 1 when he asked ‘Where
is it?’ My stomach turned over as I realised my omission
— I had forgotten the judgment. I wanly whispered that I
could give him a pile of papers that might look to the rest

of the courtroom like a real judgment. He firmly replied
‘No’. I briskly walked from the courtroom in the hope that
I might get up to chambers and back with the judgment in
time. Needless to say, I failed, and the transcript for the
morning reads:
‘Kirby J: I concur with Chief Justice Brennan, and will
deliver my reasons when they arrive.’
I expected him to be furious at lunchtime, but he graciously
accepted my apologies, smiled and said ‘We all make
mistakes Andrew’.

Justice Kirby’s humanity was also evident in his dealings
with the international community, as remembered by
Katharine Young:
In 2006, Kirby J gave a keynote address to an international
gathering of judges at Harvard Law School. The setting
was very serious and formal, perhaps even a trifle
conservative. Justice Kirby’s speech described the trend
of judges citing each other’s opinions and learning about
each other’s systems of law and about international law:
a trend, of course, which he was part of setting. Towards
the end of the speech, the subject turned to the human
rights implications of same-sex marriage. Justice Kirby gave
an expert summary of equality jurisprudence, and then
mentioned his and his partner Johan’s thoughts on marriage.
It was a celebration of judicial candour, as well as of equality
in the law, and I doubt it will be forgotten by many of the
judges, law professors and students present.

Fare well
Justice Kirby will be remembered as a unique justice
of the High Court of Australia. His associates will
remember him as an extraordinary boss and the
time working for him as fascinating, demanding and
sometimes surprising. I’m sure we will all hear about his
activities post-judicial office. From all of us, Judge, fare
well but not farewell.

4. Katharine was Justice Kirby’s associate
in 2001, currently SJD Candidate and
Graduate Fellow, Edmond J Safra
Foundation Center for Ethics 2007–2008,
Harvard Law School.
5. Andrew was Justice Kirby’s associate
in 1997/1998 and is currently Associate
Professor, Economics Program, Research
School of Social Sciences, The Australian
National University.

ELISA ARCIONI was Justice Kirby’s associate in
2002/2003. She is currently a lecturer in law at the
University of Wollongong.
© 2009 Elisa Arcioni

‘Recruiting and Retaining …’ continued from page 35
• Providing financial and/or tax incentives for RRR
students and lawyers;
• Addressing salary levels and working conditions
within CLCs;
• Responding to demographic change and need within
the legal profession; and,
• Increasing the commitment of public sector funding
to legal service provision.
TRISH MUNDY teaches law at Griffith Law School
on the Gold Coast.
This article reports on the findings of a more detailed
report, completed in July 2008, which was initiated
by the Northern Rivers Community Legal Centre and
supported by the NSW Law & Justice Foundation. The
full report can be found at <nrclc.org.au/SiteMedia/
w3svc728/Uploads/ Documents/RecruitmentRetentio
nOfLawyers.pdf>.
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ON MICHAEL KIRBY
Justice Kirby and references
to the Alternative Law Journal
SIMON RICE wonders at the impact of our Journal
In a recent trivia quiz on law reform and social justice, I
had to warn contestants that, despite their instincts, the
answer to four of the 10 questions was not ‘Michael
Kirby’. The answer to one was; the answers to the
other three were Lionel Murphy, Isaac Isaacs and
Professor Michael Coper.
But here is a question I didn’t ask, to which ‘Michael
Kirby’ is the answer: ‘Which High Court judge has
referred to Alternative Law Journal articles in their
decisions more often than any other judge?’ The only
other judges to do so are Brennan CJ, McHugh J and
Murphy J (once each), the latter two referring to the
journal when it was the Legal Service Bulletin (in Pollitt
v R [1992] HCA 35; (1992) 174 CLR 558 and Koowarta
v Bjelke-Petersen [1982] HCA 27; (1982) 153 CLR 168
respectively).

Negligence
Chief Justice Brennan’s reference was in the same case,
and to the same article, as the first of the eight cases in
which Kirby J referred to the Alternative Law Journal;
Romeo v Conservation Commission of the Northern
Territory [1998] HCA 5, (1998) 192 CLR 431. Justice
Kirby was one of five judges who dismissed an appeal
and confirmed that a young woman, aged 16, who had
fallen in a nature reserve and become a paraplegic,
was not entitled to damages from a public authority. In
an earlier High Court decision, Nagle v Rottnest Island
Authority [1993] HCA 43, (1993) 177 CLR 423, a public
authority had been held liable in similar circumstances.
The Nagle decision was controversial, and was
criticised by Sandra Berns in an Opinion piece, ‘Judicial
paternalism and the High Court’ (1993) 18 Alt LJ 202.
Berns’ view was that ‘Nagle imposes an unrealistic
standard of care on public authorities’, and that ‘[t]he
court’s paternalistic attitude is truly remarkable’. Justice
Kirby noted the criticisms of Nagle and referred to the
Berns’ Opinion, but for purposes of deciding Romeo he
distinguished Nagle on its facts. Chief Justice Brennan,
who had dissented in Nagle, cited Berns’ Opinion
and, alone of the seven judges, said Nagle should be
overruled.

The race power
Three months after the decision Romeo, the High Court
decided the important ‘Hindmarsh Island Bridge case’,
Kartinyeri v Commonwealth [1998] HCA 22, (1998)
195 CLR 337. Justice Kirby was in sole dissent. At
issue was the constitutional validity of legislation that
removed the protection against development that the
Heritage Protection Act offered to aboriginal land. The
majority view was that the legislation was valid under
48 — AltLJ Vol 34:1 2009

the ‘race’ power: s 51(xxvi) of the Constitution. In Kirby
J’s view, the race power did not extend to a law that
‘is detrimental to, and adversely discriminates against,
people of the Aboriginal race of Australia by reference
to their race’.
In recounting the background to the litigation,
particularly a failed challenge against a South Australian
Royal Commission into the indigenous claims
concerning Hindmarsh Island, Kirby J referred to
Maureen Tehan’s article, ‘A tale of two cultures’ (1996)
21 Alt LJ 10, in which Tehan gives an account of legal
and related events in the long-running case, including
the political background, the Federal Court cases, and
Royal Commission inquiry and findings.

Battered woman syndrome
At the end of the same year, 1998 — a busy one for
the Alternative Law Journal in the High Court — Kirby
J was part of a narrow (3:2) majority in Osland v R
[1998] HCA 75, (1998) 197 CLR 316, upholding
the conviction of Heather Osland for the murder of
her husband. Mrs Osland’s appeal relied in part on
directions given by the trial judge on the defences
of provocation and self-defence as they related to
battered woman syndrome. On this question all judges
agreed that the appeal failed, but Kirby J added lengthy
comments on battered woman syndrome, discussing
issues about the accuracy of its name, and its status as a
scientific phenomenon on which expert evidence could
reliably be given.
In considering the extent to which the manifestation of
battered woman syndrome is culturally specific, Kirby
J referred to Ian Freckelton’s Brief: ‘Battered Woman
Syndrome’ (1992) 17 Alt LJ 39. Reporting on Runjancic
and Kontinnen v R (1991) 53 A Crim R 262, the first
case in which evidence of battered woman syndrome
had been admitted in a superior court in Australia,
Freckelton discusses the extent to which women can be
assumed to react in a particular way to the experience
of living in a violent relationship. He notes that:
[t]he danger is that women who are the subject of domestic
violence come to be expected to exhibit ‘classic signs’ of
battered woman syndrome and in fact, because of their
particular personality or background, do not fit the mould
(for instance because of their cultural background), their
attempts to mount defence of self-defence, provocation
and duress will be undermined.

Lawyer’s immunity
The following year the case of Boland v Yates Property
Corporation Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 64, (1999) 167
ALR 575 offered the High Court the opportunity to
reconsider the scope of its decision in Giannarelli v
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Wraith [1988] HCA 52, (1988) 165 CLR 543, in which
it had confirmed the legal profession’s immunity from
claims of negligence for court-related work. Apart from
Kirby J, only Gaudron J was prepared to reconsider
Giannarelli, but as she upheld the appeal on other
grounds she felt it unnecessary to do so.
Although Kirby J agreed with the result in the case,
allowing the appeal and setting aside the orders of
the Federal Court, he was alone in his support for
the Federal Court’s reservations about the scope of
the High Court’s decision in Giannarelli. Justice Kirby
referred to Simone Brookes’ article, ‘Time to abolish
lawyers’ immunity from suit’ (1999) 24 Alt LJ 175, the
title of which states clearly Kirby J’s own view. Brookes’
analysis of the advocates’ immunity is based on a
comparison with the liability of medical practitioners,
an analogy rejected by McHugh J in D’Orta-Ekenaike
v Victoria Legal Aid (below). Justice Kirby referred to
Brookes when commenting on the oft-noted contrast
between the ‘ever more stringent obligations of care’
imposed on other professionals and ‘the immunity
accorded by the law to its own’.
Some years later, the case of D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria
Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12, (2005) 223 CLR 1 gave Kirby
J the chance to restate his call to reconsider Giannarelli.
After committal, trial, conviction, appeal, re-trial and
acquittal on a charge of rape, Mr D’Orta-Ekenaike sued
his lawyers, who relied on the Giannarelli immunity.
Although Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon
JJ were blunt in saying ‘Giannarelli should not be reopened’, and McHugh J was of the same mind, Kirby
J saw the issue not as a ‘re-opening’ of Giannarelli, but
as a necessary clarification of its meaning and scope.
In a long and detailed analysis Kirby J again referred to
Brookes’ article.

Fresh evidence
In Re Sinanovic’s Application [2001] HCA 40, (2001)
180 ALR 448 Kirby J sat alone to decide whether to
give leave to an applicant to re-open an application
for special leave to appeal after the application had
previously been refused by Gummow and Callinan JJ.
The applicant was illiterate, indigent and incarcerated,
and Kirby J allowed his wife to speak on his behalf. The
applicant could show neither exceptional circumstances
nor fresh evidence, and so the application was refused.
In his decision Kirby J observed that a:
good instance of the discovery of … fresh evidence
recently arose in [R v Button [2001] QCA 13, where] DNA
evidence, discovered after a trial and before the hearing of
the appeal in that Court, conclusively demonstrated that
the prisoner was innocent,

and referred to a note about the case in (2001) 26
Alternative Law Journal 97 at 97–98. The note was a
contribution by Jeff Giddings to the national round-up
column DownUnderAllOver, and recounts how the
Queensland Court of Appeal released a man on the
basis of evidence that had arisen after his conviction.

Free speech

the ABC’s screening of a television program, but on
different grounds from the majority. Kirby alone found
that the discretion had miscarried because it ‘was
granted without appropriate consideration of the
constitutional principle in Lange protecting freedom of
communication concerning governmental and political
matters’. The other judges found it unnecessary to
decide this ground of appeal.
The subject matter of the television program was
the commercial ‘processing’ of brush-tailed possums.
Kirby J saw this as being within the scope of the
constitutional principle in Lange, saying that ‘[t]he
concerns of a governmental and political character
must not be narrowly confined’, and that ‘concerns
about animal welfare [and the export of animals and
animal products] are clearly legitimate matters of public
debate across the nation’. In observing that ‘[m]any
advances in animal welfare have occurred only because
of public debate and political pressure from special
interest groups’, Kirby J referred to an article by one
of the McLibel co-defendants, Dave Morris, ‘McLibel:
do-it-yourself justice’ (1999) 24 Alt LJ 269. In the article
Morris tells the story of the McDonald’s Corporation’s
infamous suit for defamation in response to leaflets that
claimed that McDonald’s caused animal suffering.

Asylum seekers
Re Woolleys [2004] HCA 49, (2004) 225 CLR 1 was
one of the many asylum seeker cases to reach the High
Court. Four Afghani children, held with their parents in
Baxter Immigration Centre, sought orders for habeas
corpus, prohibition and injunction. In seven separate
opinions the High Court unanimously dismissed the
application. Kirby J agreed that children were lawfully
detained, saying that the relevant terms of the Migration
Act were clear, valid, and ‘the result of a deliberately
devised and deliberately maintained policy of the
Parliament’. In noting that the position in relation to
detention of asylum seekers is different in Europe,
Kirby J referred to a Brief on asylum seekers by Jane
McAdam, ‘Australia and Europe – worlds apart’ (2003)
28 Alt LJ 193 in which McAdam details the many ways in
which treatment of asylum seekers was more humane
in Europe than in Australia.
In each of these eight decisions, Kirby J referred to
material in the Alternative Law Journal to support
argument, and to provide background and detail. His
use of the Journal illustrates the wide range of topics it
covers, from evidentiary rules and criminal defences to
asylum seekers and lawyers’ negligence, and shows too
the useful diversity of ways in which the Journal publishes
material: refereed articles, shorter descriptive ‘briefs’,
reporting of current issues, and editorial opinions.
It seems apt that it is the High Court judge who has in
his decisions been most attuned to the effect of law on
minority groups and the marginalised who has found
most to rely on in Australia’s ‘alternative’ law journal.  
SIMON RICE teaches law at ANU.
© 2009 Simon Rice

In ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63,
(2001) 208 CLR 199 Kirby J agreed with the result,
allowing an appeal against the decision of the Full
Court of the Tasmanian Supreme Court to injunct
AltLJ Vol 34:1 2009 — 49
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HUMAN RIGHTS
The Haneef Case and an independent
review of terrorism law
MARK RIX considers the creation of the Office of National Security Legislation Monitor

REFERENCES
1. The Report of the Clarke Inquiry into
the Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef is
available at <haneefcaseinquiry.gov.au/
www/inquiry/haneefcaseinquiry.nsf/Page/
Report> at 9 February 2009.
2. Haneef v Minister for Immigration and
Citizenship [2007] FCA 1273; Minister
for Immigration and Citizenship v Haneef
[2007] FCAFC 203.
3. The Street Review: A Review of
Interoperability between the AFP and
its National Security Partners, available
at <afp.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_
file/71833/The_Street_Review.pdf> at 9
February 2009.
4. ABC Radio, ‘Ruddock defends AFP in
Haneef inquiry’, PM, 1 September 2008,
<abc.net.au/pm/content/2008/s2352290.
htm> at 9 February 2009.
5. Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Intelligence and Security, Review of Security
and Counter Terrorism Legislation (2006)
<aph.gov.au/house/committee/pjcis/
securityleg/report.htm> at 9 February
2009.

On 23 December last year, the Rudd Government
tabled in Parliament the Honourable John Clarke’s
Report of the Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed
Haneef.1 In fact, it tabled only Volume One, the public
report. Volume Two, which contains what Mr Clarke
describes as ‘supplementary material’ including ‘sensitive
or classified material’, was not tabled and has not yet
been made public (if it ever will be). Before briefly
considering the public report’s recommendations and
the Government’s response, a quick run down of the
details of the Haneef case and setting up and conduct
of the Clarke inquiry will be provided.
Dr Mohamed Haneef, an Indian doctor then working
at the Gold Coast hospital, was arrested on 2 July
2007 and held without charge for 12 days under
provisions of Australia’s anti-terrorism legislation (ss
23DA, 23CB Crimes Act,). On 14 July he was charged
under s.102.7(2) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code
with the offence of recklessly providing support to a
terrorist organisation on the grounds that his mobile
phone Subscriber Information Module (SIM) card
was connected to failed terrorist attacks in Britain.
Dr Haneef was granted bail by a Brisbane magistrate
two days after being charged, but within hours of the
magistrate’s ruling the then Immigration Minister Kevin
Andrews cancelled Haneef ’s work visa because he
failed the character test under s 501(3) of the Migration
Act 1958 (Cth), preventing his release from custody.
The following day Attorney-General Philip Ruddock
issued a Criminal Justice Stay Certificate under s 147
of the Migration Act which stopped Haneef from being
deported and required him to remain in detention
while the criminal proceedings against him continued.
Haneef was held in immigration detention and later
home detention for nearly two weeks. On 27 July,
the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions
withdrew the charge against Dr Haneef on the basis
that there was insufficient evidence to support a
conviction, and the Attorney-General cancelled the
Criminal Justice Stay Certificate. He was allowed to
return voluntarily to India on 28 July despite his visa
remaining cancelled. Justice Spender of the Federal
Court set aside the visa cancellation decision on 21
August 2007, a decision upheld by the Full Bench of the
Federal Court in December 2007 dismissing an appeal
by Minister Andrews.2
In March 2008 the Rudd Government announced
that a judicial inquiry into the Haneef affair would
be conducted by the Honourable John Clarke QC,
a retired NSW Supreme Court Judge. At the top
of its terms of reference, the inquiry was asked to
examine and report on ‘the arrest, detention, charging,
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prosecution and release of Dr Haneef, the cancellation
of his Australian visa and issuing of a criminal justice
stay certificate.’ Among its other terms of reference,
the Clarke inquiry, like the AFP-initiated Street
Review into the failed case of terror suspect Izhar UlHaque3, was to examine and report on improving cooperation, co-ordination and ‘interoperability’ between
Commonwealth agencies including the AFP, ASIO and
the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.
The Clarke inquiry was for the most part conducted
in private (the opening day of the inquiry was its only
public hearing), did not have the power to compel
witnesses to give evidence or face cross-examination,
and witnesses were not given indemnity against
defamation or self-incrimination. On 31 August 2008,
the AFP announced that it had formally abandoned its
investigation of Dr Mohamed Haneef because there
was no evidence against him. The total cost of the
AFP’s investigation of Haneef was around $8 million.4
In all, the Clarke inquiry made 10 recommendations,
the most important of these being ‘that consideration
be given to the appointment of an independent
reviewer of Commonwealth counter-terrorism laws.’
Before considering this recommendation and the
Government’s response to it in a little more detail, it
should be noted here that the Clarke Inquiry report
was not the sole counter-terrorism document tabled
in the Federal Parliament on 23 December 2008. On
the same day, the Government also tabled, in the
words of Attorney-General Robert McClelland, ‘the
Rudd Government’s comprehensive response to
outstanding reviews of national security legislation from
the term of the former Government’. Specifically, the
Government responded to the Australian Law Reform
Commission’s ‘Fighting Words: A Review of Sedition
Laws in Australia’ (tabled 13 September 2006), the
‘Review of Security and Counter-Terrorism Legislation’
by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence
and Security (PJCIS) (tabled 4 December 2006) and
the PJCIS’s ‘Inquiry into the proscription of ‘terrorist
organisations’ under the Australian Criminal Code’
which had been tabled on 20 September 2007.
The Government accepted the Clarke inquiry’s
recommendation to give consideration to the
appointment of an independent reviewer of
Commonwealth counter-terrorism laws, but gave its
reasons for doing so in its Response to the PJCIS’s
‘Review of Security and Counter-Terrorism Legislation’.5
The PJCIS review called for the ‘Government to
appoint an independent person of high standing as an
Independent Reviewer of terrorism law in Australia’,
and recommended that the Independent Reviewer

BRIEFS
be able to set his or her own priorities and be given
access to all ‘necessary information’. The Independent
Reviewer would be required to provide an annual report
to Parliament. In a related recommendation, the PJCIS
called for an amendment to the Intelligence Services
Act 2001 (Cth) requiring the PJCIS to examine the
Independent Reviewer’s reports tabled in Parliament.

For these reasons, Australia can ill afford to have a
repeat of the Haneef affair. The appointment of an
independent National Security Legislation Monitor
hopefully will not only bring about significant and muchneeded improvements to Australia’s counter-terrorism
legislation, it may also avert the recurrence of such a
debacle in future.

In its response, the Government stated that a new
statutory office in the Prime Minister’s Portfolio
would be established to be known as the ‘National
Security Legislation Monitor’ who would be required
to report regularly to Parliament. The Monitor would
enable ongoing review of national security laws to be
conducted in a more comprehensive, and less ad hoc
and piecemeal, fashion than had been possible in the
past. This would in turn permit ‘ongoing improvement’
of the laws.

MARK RIX teaches at the University of Wollongong.
© 2009 Mark Rix

The Government’s acceptance of this recommendation
is to be commended. Appointment of an independent
Monitor by statute, and the requirement that they
report to Parliament on a regular basis, will be a small
but hopefully significant first step towards removal of
the ambiguities, sloppy definitions and catch-all offences
that are contained in Australia’s counter-terrorism laws
and which made possible the whole, sorry Haneef
‘affair’. To be sure, a number of these issues are dealt
with on a largely ad hoc basis in the Government’s
responses to the PJCIS and Australian Law Reform
Commission inquiries and reviews that were tabled
on the same day as the Clarke inquiry report and
the Government’s response to it. However, as the
Government acknowledged, a much more wholesale
and holistic approach to the reform and improvement
of Australia’s counter-terrorism legislation is required
than could be adopted by these inquiries and reviews.
This is why a truly independent Monitor of national
security legislation is needed.
The Monitor cannot simply be asked to wait for
referrals by parliamentary committees or the like
before setting about the task of reviewing the
legislation and recommending improvements to bring
it more into line with human rights, due process and
criminal justice standards. Unfortunately, the Monitor is
no substitute for the political will required to put her/
his recommendations and improvements into effect.
But that said, the creation of the office should at least
provide a reliable rear defence when political will has to
be demonstrated by the Government in Parliament and
in public debate.
Beyond the Clarke inquiry report and the
Government’s response to its recommendations, the
Haneef case is important in other key respects. It
demonstrates how the making of a crude association
between Islam, Muslims and terrorism — an important
element of the political climate created by the
Howard Government’s counter-terrorism legislation
— permitted the AFP to perpetrate abuses of human
rights and due process. And it shows how, at the
very time when social cohesion and inclusiveness —
Australia’s best defence against home-grown terrorist
violence — is most required, the political climate and
the abuses that it allowed to occur, threatened to sow
the seeds of division, suspicion and cynicism through
the Australian community.
AltLJ Vol 34:1 2009 — 51

BRIEFS

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
What’s happening with discrimination
in South Australia?
ANNE HEWITT delves into the state’s out-of-date anti-discrimination laws
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When South Australia introduced the Prohibition
of Discrimination Act (SA) in 1966 it was at the
cutting edge of Australia’s anti-discrimination law
— this was the very first piece of anti-discrimination
legislation in Australia. However, since the 1960s
South Australia has fallen to the back of the pack
in terms of its regulation of discrimination. No
significant amendments have been made to the Equal
Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) since the 1997 introduction
of provisions regarding sexual harassment.1 South
Australia is now one of the few states which fail
to prohibit discrimination based on religious belief,
political opinion or activity, parental status, association
with a child, pregnancy or mental illness.

is already offered to victims of particular types of
discrimination under Commonwealth legislation, or
that the scope of the proposed prohibitions is too
broad.5 Not all of these objections will be considered
here. However, it is interesting to consider a number of
objections to the proposed amendments expressed by
religious groups.

A review of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) was
commissioned more than 14 years ago, and amending
legislation was first proposed in 2002, but was delayed
as a result of the 2002 state elections. Finally, legislation
was proposed in 2006 to modernise the Act ‘to ensure
comprehensive protection of South Australians against
unjustified discrimination’.2 The amending legislation
would have extended prohibitions on discrimination
to cover (among other things): marital status; identity
of a spouse; pregnancy; association with a child
(including breast feeding); caring responsibilities;
religious appearance or dress,3 mental illness and nonsymptomatic conditions such as HIV.4

the main Western Christian denominations, the Greek
Orthodox archdiocese and the Greek Evangelical Church,
opposed it, as did many Christian schools. They feared the
new laws would prevent them from freely preaching and
practising their religion and from seeking to convert others.6

However, the 2006 Bill didn’t progress far, or fast.
The Liberal party and Family First both expressed
strong opposition to the Bill. The second reading
debate in the House of Assembly was completed
on 21 February 2007, following which the Bill was
referred to Committee. The Bill dropped off the
notice paper, was restored on 1 May 2007, and lapsed
again due to the prorogation of parliament. A new
version of the Bill was introduced on 26 November
2008. The 2008 Bill is similar to the previous version,
but some of the more controversial amendments have
been reduced or removed.
The delays in passing these important amendments
to the law, and the reduction in the scope of the
amendments proposed, are both cause for concern.
Why has this happened? The answer appears to
be that there is substantial opposition to some of
the amendments.

So, who is objecting to the amendments
and why?
As the parliamentary debates on the 2006 Bill illustrate,
there were a number of objections being made to the
scope and nature of the proposed amendments. Many
of these objections relate to the fact that protection

Prior to the introduction of the Bill in 2006 several
Christian religious groups in South Australia expressed
clear objections to any introduction to a prohibition on
religious discrimination in the state. In a 2006 interview,
Attorney-General Michael Atkinson explained the
opposition to such a prohibition:

As a result of such objections the government decided
not to introduce a prohibition of discrimination based
on religion, and instead proposed a limited prohibition
on discrimination based on religious dress or
appearance in the 2006 Bill. A similarly limited provision
appears in the 2008 version of the Bill.7
However, despite the limitation in the scope of
the proposed amendments in relation to religious
discrimination, there remained substantial objection
to the 2006 Bill from some religious groups. Many of
these objections related to the proposed expansion of
the definition of victimisation to include engaging in:
a public act inciting hatred, serious contempt or severe
ridicule of the person or a group of persons of which the
person is a member on a ground of discrimination that is
unlawful by virtue of this Act.8

Some religious groups expressed apprehension that
this provision would allow actions be taken against
religious leaders who criticize or denounce the beliefs
or practices of other religious groups.
There was active campaigning on this issue. For
example, a search of the internet revealed several
active campaigns against the 2006 Bill in the form it was
proposed, encouraging individuals to contact members
of the House of Assembly in order to persuade
them that passing the Bill would limit free speech and
freedom of religion. One website includes a template
for a letter writing campaign to upper house MPs,
which reads in part ‘Please vote against clause 61 of the
Equal Opportunity (Miscellaneous) Amendment Bill and
other parts which would prevent religious institutions
from promoting traditional values.’9
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As similar fear was also reflected in the parliamentary
debate regarding the 2006 proposed Bill which
demonstrates concern about the possibility of a ‘Catch
the Fire’10 style application of the legislation.11 However,
as the 2006 Bill did not actually propose to prohibit
discrimination based on religious belief, it is improbable
that a ‘public act inciting hatred, serious contempt or
severe ridicule’ of a group defined by religious belief
would have constituted victimisation ‘on a ground of
discrimination that is unlawful by virtue of this Act’.
Therefore, this particular concern appears unfounded.
Despite this, the proposed expansion of the definition
of victimisation which appeared in the 2006 Bill has
been removed from the 2008 version.
There were further objections to the 2006 proposed
amendments from religious groups — specifically,
that the amendments would limit the ability of
religious organisations to engage in certain types of
discriminatory action.12 For example, there were
amendments that (if passed) would mean that:
• religious hospitals, childcare centres and other
organisations would no longer be able to discriminate
on the ground of sexuality;13
• religious schools would only be able to discriminate in
employing staff on the grounds of sexuality if such a
policy were advertised to all current and prospective
employees, parents and students, and lodged with the
Equal Opportunity Commissioner;14 and
• religious schools would not be allowed to
discriminate against students on any of the prohibited
grounds — including sexuality and religion.15
Despite the objections made to these provisions in the
2006 Bill, they have remained in the 2008 proposals.

Where to from here?
As is apparent from the brief discussion above, there
are a number of specific objections being made to the
proposed amendments to the Equal Opportunity Act
1984 (SA), as well as general objections to its scope.
These objections appear to have been successful in
slowing the progress of the legislative amendment to
date, and in having some of the proposed amendments
(especially to victimisation provisions) abandoned.
Whatever the merit of the particular objections, it
is important that the discussion move back into the
public arena. Now that a new version of the amending
legislation has been tabled in parliament the time is ripe
for informed public debate on these topics.  
ANNE HEWITT teaches law at the University
of Adelaide.
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